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ABSTRACT
The assumption that the democratisation of environmental law is central to ensuring
the legitimacy of decisions permeates the literature. Using an empirically grounded
counter narrative, this article confronts and contests that assumption. It argues that in
the context of shale gas/fracking, public understanding positions expertise not as an
obstacle to legitimacy, but rather as a foundational factor. This involves a role in which
experts fulfil a publicly delegated role, the delineation of which warrants a form of par-
ticipation that repositions its purpose and value. However, this conceptualisation of an
expert’s role, and the type of participation required, demonstrates a fundamental public
misunderstanding about what experts can deliver: ‘expert excess’. This article argues
that we, as scholars, need to reflect upon: (1) the weight given to empirical perceptions
of legitimacy and participation when developing theoretical models; (2) why there is
such a misconception around what experts can deliver in decision-making.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The assumption that the democratisation of environmental law is central to ensuring the
legitimacy of decisions permeates the literature. Yet the empirically grounded counter nar-
rative, from the shale gas context, presented here confronts and contests that assumption.
We want experts. We want people who know about these things. I’m only a lay
person. I’m a farmer. I’ve dealt with the land all my life, but we want people who
know what’s happening 2 miles down and there aren’t many of those, are there?1
Shale gas developments in England have proved to be controversial. Attention first
focused on the shale gas industry when, on the 1 April 2011, a seismic tremor of
magnitude 2.3 affected residents close to the Preese Hall shale gas exploration site in
Lancashire.2 This triggered a temporary moratorium on all hydraulic fracturing
* Lecturer of Law, University of Leeds (j.hawkins@leeds.ac.uk).
1 M1 Interview 16.
2 British Geological Survey, ‘Blackpool Earthquake’ (27 May 2011) <www.earthquakes.bgs.ac.uk/research/
events/BlackpoolMay2011.html> accessed 3 July 2019.
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(fracking) activities in England. Although this ban was lifted in December 2012, ex-
ploratory progress since then has been notably slow with the first post-ban fracking
taking place in October 2018.3 Planning appeals, legal challenges and protests have
been prolific.4 In the controversial context of shale gas and fracking, this article seeks
to re-evaluate the current theoretical assumptions underpinning how we define legit-
imate decision-making. It contests the assumption that direct participation and the
democratisation of decision-making is central to achieving such legitimacy. It exam-
ines what the public consider to be legitimate decision-making in this context by
drawing on data from interviews and focus groups with 36 people (27 members of
the public impacted by shale gas exploration; eight members of the shale gas indus-
try; and one member of a regulatory body). This article defines ‘legitimate’ to mean
decision-making that is accepted, by the public, because it is considered worthy of
recognition. For these interviewees, legitimate decision-making was underpinned by
legitimate decision-making procedures. Where the decision-making process was con-
sidered legitimate (ie worthy of recognition) this generated acceptability of the pro-
cedure itself, but also triggered the perceived legitimacy of the decision’s outcome
(even if this was counter to interviewees personal views on shale gas). Given the
highly controversial nature of shale gas and fracking, the public’s perception of
decision-making procedures is thus important.5 If decision-making procedures are
not considered legitimate, visible public opposition and protest are likely to increase.
The people in this study expressed a clear preference for expert-led decision-
making procedures. As such, the assumed need for the democratisation of decision-
making, a staple of contemporary environmental law, across jurisdictions, is ques-
tioned.6 Expertise, rather than being an obstacle to legitimacy, is in fact the founda-
tional factor which affects interviewees’ perception of decision-making legitimacy.
For this section of the public, the data shows that ‘expert’ is a trust-based status,
bestowed upon a group of people to whom decision-making power can be delegated
with a clearly delineated goal; namely environmental protection. By dictating this
3 ‘Written Ministerial Statement by Edward Davey: Exploration for Shale Gas’ (News Story, 13 December
2012) <www.gov.uk/government/news/written-ministerial-statement-by-edward-davey-exploration-for-
shale-gas> accessed 3 July 2019; Cuadrilla Resources, ‘Hydraulic Fracturing to Go Ahead at Shale Gas Site
in Lancashire’ (12 October 2018) <https://cuadrillaresources.com/media-resources/press-releases/hy
draulic-fracturing-to-go-ahead-at-shale-gas-exploration-site-in-lancashire/> accessed 3 July 2019; Fracking
at the Preston New Road site in 2018 triggered a number of minor earth tremors, some of which halted
activities due to the new traffic light management system. Further details can be found at British
Geological Survey, ‘Seismic Activity at Preston New Road: FAQs’ <http://earthquakes.bgs.ac.uk/re
search/PrestonNewRoadFAQ.html> accessed 3 July 2019.
4 See for Preston New Road Action Group v Secretary of State for Communities [2018] EWCA Civ 9; Planning
Appeal for Roseacre Wood Exploration Site (APP/Q2371/W/15/313438) (August 2015); Planning Appeal
for Preston New Road Exploration Site (APP/Q2371/W/15/3134386) (August 2015).
5 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’ (2003) 30 Crime and Justice
283; Tom Tyler, ‘Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decision-making Procedures on the
Legitimacy of Government’ (1994) 28 Law & Society Review 809.
6 See, for example, Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment. The Regulation of Decision-making (OUP 2006);
Maria Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environmental Law’ in Damien Chalmers and Anthony Arnull
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Law (OUP 2015) 993; Maria Lee, ‘The Legal and
Institutionalization of Public Participation in the EU Governance of Technology’ in Roger Brownsword,
Eloise Scotford and Karen Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (OUP
2016).
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goal, the act of delegation places the public in a position of power reconstructing
their relationship with experts.
However, despite the explicit demand for expert-led decision-making, the data
reveals two inherent contradictions. First, the misconception of ‘expert excess’: an ex-
cessive expectation about what experts can and will deliver in decision-making. At
present experts are under no obligation to pursue any broader social/political goal
(eg environmental protection) and what they can achieve in decision-making is in-
herently constrained by their own inherent values and knowledge traditions; some-
thing that interviewees did not acknowledge. Second, that despite calling for expert-
led decision-making, delegation of a goal requires an opportunity for the public to
define this goal, necessitating some form of public input. However, the participation
needed has a different purpose and value to that of the familiar call for the democra-
tisation of decision-making. This difference forces us to reflect on the difficulty of
designing the type of participation that is needed, and the type of participation that
the public consider to have legitimating value. This compels us to consider the need
for fresh perspectives on participation.7
Given the qualitative nature of the study, this article does not claim that the find-
ings are generalisable, nor that our understanding of legitimate decision-making is
necessarily misplaced in all arenas. However, it highlights the need to reflect on why
current theoretical assumptions about what constitutes a legitimate decision (eg the
assumption that direct participation in decision-making is desirable) which may be
justifiable on grounds of better procedural representativeness or better openness in
decision-making, fail to correspond with empirically grounded public perceptions of
legitimate decision-making.4 The empirical findings presented here are based on data
from multiple sites in multiple locations and emphasise how important it is that we
map theoretical discussions against empirical data. This forces us to reflect upon how
the scholarship does and should define legitimate decision-making, and the extent to
which this definition should give weight to the empirical. Given the lack of empirical
socio-legal work in environmental law and on fracking in England this research
begins to address a significant scholarly gap.8
This article opens by providing an outline of hydraulic fracturing/fracking and
why it provides such an interesting lens through which to examine perceptions of
decision-making legitimacy, followed by an overview of the research methodology. It
moves on to discuss how existing scholarship has approached legitimate decision-
making before discussing the central finding of the research; the desire for expert-led
decision-making. It then explores how the public conceptualisation of an expert’s
role, and the type of participation this warrants, differs greatly from scholar’s
7 Jenny Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving
Approach’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415; Rene´e Irvin and John Stansbury, ‘Citizen
Participation in Decision-making: Is It Worth the Effort’ (2004) 64 Public Administration Rev 55, 62;
Anna Davies, ‘Hidden or Hiding? Public Perceptions of Participation in the Planning System’ (2001) 72
The Town Planning Review 193, 194; Alan Irwin, Torben Elgaard Jensen and Kevin Jones, ‘The Good,
the Bad and the Perfect : Criticizing Engagement in Practice’ (2013) 43 Social Studies of Science 118, 120.
8 Elizabeth Fisher and others, ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213, 247; Cary Coglianese and Catherine Courcy, ‘Environmental Regulation’
in Peter Cane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010)
449.
Fracking and the Case of Expert Excess  3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jel/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jel/eqz022/5557829 by guest on 09 April 2020
traditional understanding; this public conceptualisation hinging instead on the dele-
gation of a pre-determined role with associated goals. The data and discussion
offered up below are important because they pose significant challenges to our exist-
ing understanding of legitimate decision-making and the value and purpose of public
participation.
2. WHAT IS FRACKING?
Hydraulic fracturing/fracking involves injecting wells (vertical wellbores with numer-
ous horizontal drillings extending outwards) at high pressure with water, proppants,
tracers and chemical additives to fracture and release natural gas.9 While fracking
only comprises one part of the process of shale gas extraction, the term is often used
as shorthand to describe (if somewhat inaccurately) the whole process from site con-
struction and the drilling of a wellbore to the underground injection and even further
to the abandonment of the well.10 As such, when interviewees discussed decisions
relating to fracking, they included any decision which related to the shale gas explor-
ation site (not just the technical injection phase). Accordingly, it is only by looking
at the process as a whole, from design through to abandonment, that public percep-
tions of legitimacy can be evaluated. As such, the term fracking will be used to cover
the entire process of exploration and utilisation.
Fracking is associated with a number of concerns, predominantly at the local
scale. First, there are risks of groundwater contamination through the fractures by
pollutants from the extraction process.11 Due to the height to which fractures extend
(US data suggests that fractures are unlikely to extend more than 1 km vertically
above the depth of drilling) and the low porosity of shale in the absence of pressure
conditions (ie fracking), this type of contamination is considered unlikely.12 There
are however additional concerns over migration of gas, fracking fluids and natural
polluting substances due to inadequate well integrity and surface spills.13 At present,
the recycling of water is not a common practice (although this may change if shale
gas developments move beyond the exploration stage to the production stage) and
the supply of/volume of freshwater required is a significant problem (particularly in
areas which experience water shortages) given that water is likely to be sourced from
utilities operators. Estimates of water use in the literature have ranged from 250 to
4,000m3 for drilling and 7,000 to 23,000m3 for hydraulic fracturing.14
9 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Guidance on Fracking. Developing Shale Gas
in the UK’ (12 March 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/about-shale-gas-and-hy
draulic-fracturing-fracking/developing-shale-oil-and-gas-in-the-uk> accessed 4 June 2019.
10 Evan House, ‘Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconventional Oil and Gas
Development’ (2013) 13 Wyoming Law Review 5, 45; this difference in definition was also clear through-
out the interviews with members of the public and industry members.
11 Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, Shale Gas Extraction in the UK; A Review of Hydraulic
Fracturing (DES2597, June 2012) 31–35.
12 ibid; M Kevin Fisher and Norman Warpinski, ‘Hydraulic Fracture Height Growth: Real Data’ (2012) 27
Society of Petroleum Engineers Productions and Operations 8, 10.
13 Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (n 11) 19, 22, 30, 34.
14 Chartered Institute of Water and Environmental Management, ‘Shale Gas and Water 2016 Summary
Report. An Independent Review of Shale Gas Extraction in the UK and the Implications for the Water
Environment’ (24 February 2016) <https://www.ciwem.org/assets/pdf/Policy/Policy%20Position
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In addition, emissions from machinery and release of gas from flaring pose prob-
lems for local air quality and health.15 Moreover, due to the high population density
in England, the increased levels of heavy duty traffic have prompted concerns over
noise and disruption as well as raising questions about the suitability of roads and
the effects of industrialisation on the local community.16 Conversely, at the local
scale, the establishment of a new shale gas industry could offer significant job oppor-
tunities and financial benefits for local communities.17 Beyond the local scale, it is ar-
guable that UK shale gas has the potential to provide increased energy security.18
However, in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
report and our binding carbon reduction targets the establishment of a new fossil
fuel industry raises questions.19
Evidently, fracking is a contested and controversial issue. The debate has triggered
a range of responses from different jurisdictions. While several bans have been imple-
mented in different countries across the globe, so too has there been active support
for shale gas exploration.20 As such, fracking offers an interesting context in which to
examine what the public consider to be a legitimate decision and how this perceived
legitimacy is constructed.
3. METHODOLOGY
The research used an inductive analysis to build key findings from emergent themes
in the data. As such, this article draws on a strong base of empirical evidence, ques-
tioning established trends in the existing literature regarding the role and value of
%20Statement/Hydraulic-fracturing-of-Shale-in-the-UK.pdf> accessed 3 July 2019; Department of
Energy and Climate Change, Fracking UK Shale: Water (UK Government February 2014).
15 Air Quality Expert Group, ‘Potential Air Quality Impacts of Shale Gas Extraction in the UK’ (Advisory
Report prepared for Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; Scottish Government; Welsh
Government; and Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, July 2018).
16 Refracktion, ‘Fracking and Its Impact on the Fylde’ <www.refracktion.com/index.php/why-be-con
cerned/fracking-and-its-impact-on-the-fylde/> accessed 3 July 2019.
17 Andrea Leadsom, ‘Government’s Vision for Shale Gas in Securing Home Grown Energy Supplies for the
UK’ (Speech at the Shale World UK 2016 conference in London, 25 May 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/governments-vision-for-shale-gas-in-securing-home-grown-energy-supplies-for-the-
uk> accessed 3 July 2019; HM Treasury, ‘Shale Wealth Fund. Response to Consultation’ (11
November) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/658793/shale_wealth_fund_response_web.pdf> accessed 3 July 2019.
18 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Shale Gas and Energy Security’ (11 October
2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/747940/Factsheet_1_-_Shale_Gas_and_Energy_Security.pdf accessed 3 July 2019; House of
Commons Library Briefing Paper, Shale Gas and Fracking (CBP 6073, 6 November 2018) 8.
19 John Broderick and others, ‘Shale Gas: An Updated Assessment of Environmental and Climate Change
Impacts’ (A Report Commissioned by the Co-operative and Undertaken by Researchers at the Tyndall
Centre, University of Manchester, November 2011); Climate Change Committee, ‘The Compatibility of
Onshore Petroleum with Meeting the UK’s Carbon Budgets’ (March 2016); Valerie Masson-Delmotte
and others (eds), Global Warming of 1.5C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of
1.5C above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of
Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to
Eradicate Poverty (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018).
20 See, for example, moratorium in place in France, Germany, Ireland and in some US states such as New
York.
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public participation.21 Ultimately, the way in which interviewees (also referred to as
‘the public’ throughout) were selected means that the research findings reflect the
perceptions of ‘local’ publics. This research does not claim that the findings are rep-
resentative of the public as a whole in the context of shale gas.22 Although focused
on ‘local’ publics, the findings pose significant challenges to our existing understand-
ing of legitimacy and highlight the broader importance of mapping theoretical
accounts against empirical data. These findings were drawn from multiple sites in
two very different geographical locations in the North (Lancashire) and South of
England (West Sussex). These different geographical areas and five current/potential
shale gas sites were chosen for two key reasons.23 First, public attitude surveys avail-
able at the time of the research design showed that awareness levels surrounding
fracking were not particularly high.24 Therefore, in order to collect meaningful data,
the research targeted those who had actual lived experience of shale gas-/fracking-
related decisions.25 Secondly, at the time, different sites had seen varying degrees of
development and impacts. One Lancashire site, and interviewees at this location, had
suffered directly negative consequences ie physical damage from seismic tremors
while others had seen little development. This meant the research could examine
whether perceptions of legitimacy differed with experience of various stages of ex-
ploratory development.26
21 Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Bristol’s ethics committee and all empirical research
was conducted in line with the Socio-Legal Studies Association ethical guidelines.
22 Notably, a regional study in 2015 (Lorraine Whitmarsh and others, ‘UK Public Perceptions of Shale Gas
Hydraulic Fracturing: The Role of Audience Message and Contextual Factors on Risk Perceptions and
Policy Support’ (2015) 160 Applied Energy 419) found that in Lancashire, local publics were more likely
to be supportive of shale gas exploration than non-local publics. However, a 2018 study (Rachel A
Howell, ‘UK Public Beliefs about Fracking and Effects of Knowledge on Beliefs and Support: A Problem
for Shale Gas Policy’ (2018) 113 Energy Policy 721) (using a national sample and so likely those not liv-
ing in affected areas) found that respondents showed less support for shale gas exploration when asked
about development in their local area compared to development in the UK more broadly. While these
results offer some insight, both studies only provide data of a limited nature, and are focused on the issue
of support/non-support. They do not give us a clear understanding of how local/national attitudes vary
and given that the data in this article came from a mix of those against/for/ambivalent about fracking, the
question over whether the findings would be replicated in non-local publics remains.
23 Note data were collected in late 2013/early 2014 and at the time these were the only sites with some level
of activity in England.
24 A ‘Britain Thinks’ report conducted found that 48% of people (in a survey of 1,001) in Blackpool; Fylde
and West Lancashire felt they knew little or nothing about shale gas in October 2012 and 35% said the
same when re-surveyed in December 2012 (following Department of Energy and Climate Change’s lifted
ban on fracking in the UK); Britain Thinks, ‘Attitudes to Natural Gas from Shale. A Report from a
Telephone Survey of 1001 Adult Residents in Blackpool; Flyde and West Lancashire’ (November 2012);
A recent Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) survey suggests that this has not
changed significantly with 2018 findings showing (15%) claimed to know a lot about it, 42% claimed
they knew a little bit about fracking and 20% were aware of fracking but did not really know what it was.
BEIS, Energy and Climate Change Public Attitude Tracker: Wave 24 (January 2018); Cuadrilla was the only
company operating in England at these current/proposed sites.
25 Caroline Stenbacka, ‘Qualitative Research Requires Quality Concepts of Its Own’ (2001) 39
Management Decision 551, 552.
26 There was no noticeable difference in perceptions of legitimacy across the sites despite being at different
stages of development. At present, shale gas development in England remains at the exploratory stage
and has not moved to a production phase.
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Addresses within a two-mile radius of sites were contacted (using the list of neigh-
bours attached to planning applications, or if these were not available using the Post
Office postcode finder).27 All respondents were interviewed. Although there was
some concern over who would respond to invites (that is, a risk of bias from those
with strong views/those inclined to participate), final interviewees could be roughly
split into even groups of pro-fracking, anti-fracking and fracking-ambivalent.28
The research used a mixed-methods approach composing of six phases. Phase 1
consisted of eight pilot interviews (10 interviewees) at a site in West Sussex
(November 2013), and Phase 2 was a single pilot focus group (five participants) at
the same site in West Sussex (December 2013). For Phase 3, 10 further interviews
(16 interviewees) were conducted at five locations in Lancashire (April 2014). Phase
4 then comprised one focus group with eight participants from different sites within
Lancashire (May 2014). Phase 5 was a focus group with eight industry members
(September 2014); and the final phase comprised a semi-structured interview with a
regulator (May 2015). Data from these final two stages were not intended to form
the central element of the research and were used to provide perspective and com-
ment on the findings from members of the public. In total, this article draws on the
views of 36 people (27 members of the public; eight industry members and one
member of a regulatory body). Due to the inductive nature of the research brief ana-
lysis was conducted concurrently with data collection throughout, so that interview
and focus group schedules could be amended to reflect emerging themes.29 No
changes were made to the data collection methods following the pilot. The continual
review and analysis of emergent themes throughout the data collection phases ren-
dered the data from the pilot comparable with the data from phases three and four.
Interviews were conducted in person and lasted approximately 50 minutes. Focus
groups were conducted in public halls close to interviewees’ addresses and lasted around
one and a half hours. Interview schedules provided a guide set of themes which allowed
interviewees to give an account of their own personal experiences/their own percep-
tions of regulatory decision-making.30 Follow-up focus group discussions, and a medium
level of moderation, enabled the exploration of emergent themes in a way that would
not have been possible through the use of interviews alone.31 All interviews, and
27 Population sizes according to the 2001 consensus: Singleton 877, Westby 1,107, Weeton 1,096, Banks
3,359, Balcombe 1,765; this two-mile radius was chosen as the list of ‘neighbours’ available on the
Lancashire planning applications provided these. Number of neighbours listed: 13 for Grange Road
Singleton site, 28 for the Preese Hall site, 55 for the Becconsall site and 57 for Anna’s Road site.
28 At the start of each interview/focus group, participants were asked about their general attitude towards
fracking.
29 David R Thomas, ‘A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data’ (2006) 27
American Journal of Evaluation 237, 238; Jennie Popay, Anne Rogers and Gareth Williams, ‘Rationale
and Standards for the Systematic Review of Qualitative Literature in Health Services Research’ (1998) 8
Qualitative Health Research 341, 348.
30 Bruce Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Scientist (6th edn, Pearson Education 1989) 105;
Monique Hennick, Inge Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods (Sage 2011) 137; Thomas
(n 29) 238; Further details on this methodology can be found in ch 2 of Joanne Hawkins, ‘The
Legitimisation of Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation: Power, Prejudice and Public Participation’ (PhD
Thesis, University of Bristol 2016).
31 Richard A Kruger and Jean A King, Involving Community Members in Focus Groups, Focus Group Kit 5
(Sage Publications 1998) 54; Ann Cronin, ‘Focus Groups’ in Nigel Gilbert (ed), Researching Social Life
Fracking and the Case of Expert Excess  7
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jel/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jel/eqz022/5557829 by guest on 09 April 2020
subsequent focus groups, were transcribed, coded and analysed. Anonymised labels
were given to the data and are used throughout this article (eg ‘C, Focus Group 2’).
4 . LEGITIMATE DECISIONS AND THE LITERATURE
The data collected provides an empirical insight into what the public consider to be
legitimate decision-making (considered worthy of recognition and consequently
accepted by the public). For my interviewees, legitimate decision-making was rooted
in decision-making procedures. Legitimate procedures generated acceptability of the
procedure itself, but also triggered the perceived legitimacy of a decision’s outcome,
and consequently it’s acceptability (even if this was counter to interviewees’ personal
views on shale gas). Given how central the decision-making process is to the way in
which interviewees define legitimate decision-making, understanding how the public
construct their understanding of a legitimate procedure in this context is
important.32
The literature on legitimate decision-making is vast, spanning across disciplines
and legitimacy has been understood in several ways. To contextualise the arguments
presented in this article, the following section provides a brief overview of how the
literature has historically shifted away from an expert dominated/technocratic vision
of decision-making legitimacy, and the key debates involved. Throughout these
debates a recurrent theme is how we should assess ‘better/more legitimate’ regula-
tory decisions. Do we consider this in terms of a decision’s substance, and/or pro-
cedural openness or representativeness, and/or public acceptability/public
perceptions of legitimacy, and how much weight should we give to each of these ele-
ments? While debates over legitimate decision-making in the literature often focus
on legitimacy in a broader sense (ie not solely focused on what the public perceive
as legitimate as is done in this article), the public’s perception of legitimacy is a fun-
damentally important issue that should not be ignored when we construct our defin-
ition.33 The value of this public perception and acceptance element should not be
underestimated. Government institutions and actors need public co-operation.
Having decision-making procedures that are perceived as legitimate (ie worthy of
recognition/acceptable) is advantageous to legal authorities and decision-makers in
implementing such decisions. Accordingly, regulation and decision-making that are
sensitive to public concerns and perceptions about the procedure are important.34
In defining legitimate decision-making, there has been a historical shift in em-
phasis, within environmental law and more broadly within Science and Technology
Studies (STS), away from a purely technocratic decision-making procedure and the
associated vision of legitimacy. This technocratic model of legitimacy relies heavily
on the law’s deference to expertise and scientific authority.35 As such, technocratic
(Sage 2008) 228; Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (4th edn, Sage 2009) 197; David L
Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research (Sage 1988) 65; Hennick, Hutter and Bailey (n 30) 137,
159.
32 Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice’ (n 5); Tyler, ‘Governing Amid Diversity’ (n 5).
33 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory
Regimes’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2.
34 Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice’ (n 5); Tyler, ‘Governing Amid Diversity’ (n 5).
35 Royal Society, The Public Understanding of Science (The Royal Society 1985).
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legitimacy is underpinned by the assumption that expertise should be privileged in
decision-making, with technical experts dominating by virtue of their specialised
knowledge.36 The historical shift away from this definition reflects that we, as schol-
ars, now recognise that while expertise still has a role to play in legitimate decision-
making, it should not dominate.37
The recognition of the limitations of technocratic legitimacy, and the dominance
of expertise, has produced the corresponding assumption in the literature that par-
ticipatory decision-making, which includes expertise as but one voice, is better or
more legitimate. This shift towards democratising decision-making can be seen in lit-
erature from the field of STS, which has examined in depth the limitations of particu-
lar approaches to decision-making procedures. This literature argues that expertise
should not be the only voice heard in decision-making.38 Participation is posited as a
crucial alternative to expertise because of the difference in how different parties will
shape an issue. This shaping, termed ‘framing’, is influenced by parties’ inherent val-
ues and worldviews. As a result, the use of a certain frame will determine the way in
which an issue is diagnosed and evaluated, shaping the available outcomes and solu-
tions.39 Given the power this affords the dominant frame, public concern over deci-
sions regarding developments are not considered to be reactions to misperceived
risk or the result of a ‘deficit’ of understanding. Instead, they are considered to be a
response to the often dominant role that experts play in regulatory decision-making
36 See collection of scholarship in ‘Special Issue: Public Engagement in Science’ (2014) 23(1) Public
Understanding of Science; Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Sage 1990) 17.
37 We now recognise that the public are not ‘lacking’ and should not be excluded from decision-making on
the basis that they are unable to contribute to the decision (ie as under a public deficit model of under-
standing, and the assumption that public concern over developments could be overcome if experts simply
explained more accessibly). The public are now considered to have alternative views/values, which pro-
vide a valuable contribution that should be incorporated into decision-making alongside expertise. That
is, we acknowledge that experts have a particular set of world views/values, and are an important con-
tributor to decision-making, but should not be permitted to dominate at the expense of alternative voices
such as the public.
38 See collection of scholarship in ‘Special Issue: Public Engagement in Science’ (n 36); Brian Wynne,
Rationality and Ritual. Participation and Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-making (2nd edn, Routledge 2013);
Brian Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics in GMOs’ (2010) 10
Science as Culture 445, 450, 452; Brian Wynne, Rationality and Ritual. The Windscale Inquiry and Nuclear
Decisions in Britain (The British Society for the History of Science 1982) 11,129; Kristen Shrader-
Frechette, ‘Evaluating the Expertise of Experts’ (1995) 6 Risk: Health, Safety and Environment 115,116;
Alan Irwin, ‘Risk, Science and Public Communication: Third Order Thinking About Scientific Culture’ in
Massimiano Bucchi and Brian Trench (eds), Handbook of Public Communication of Science and Technology
(Routledge 2008) 167; Brian Wynne, ‘Public Participation in Science and Technology: Performing and
Obscuring a Political-Conceptual Category Mistake’ (2008) 1 East Asian Science, Technology and
Society: An International Journal 99, 109; Paul Slovic, ‘The Risk Game’ (2001) 86 Journal of Hazardous
Materials 17, 19.
39 Robert Entman, ‘Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’ (1993) 43 Journal of
Communication 51, 52; Elaine Vaughan and Marianne Seifert, ‘Variability in the Framing of Risk Issues’
(1992) 48 Journal of Social Issues 119, 121; Donald Schon and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward
the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies (Basic Books 1994) 29; Regula Hanggli and Hanspeter
Kriesi, ‘Frame Construction and Frame Promotion (Strategic Framing Choices)’ (2012) 56 American
Behavioural Scientist 260, 266; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice’ (1981) 211 Science 453, 458; Sally Eden, ‘Public Participation in Environmental
Policy: Considering Scientific, Counter Scientific and Non Scientific Contributions’ (1996) 5 Public
Understanding of Science 183, 187.
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and the lack of power afforded to the public.40 The public do not claim to have ex-
pert authority or dispute the expert assertions regarding risk, but they are question-
ing the degree of control that experts have and the imbalance of power this
generates.41 Such scholarship, which focuses on the limitations of particular
approaches to decision-making, highlights that without public participation, imbalan-
ces of power (eg where experts dominate decision-making) can generate dissatisfac-
tion with both the decision-making process and the decision outcome.42 In light of
the definition of legitimacy used in this article, such dissatisfaction and failure to rec-
ognise the procedure as worthy is problematic. Accordingly, whilst focusing on the
limitations of different approaches to decision-making, the scholarship supports a vi-
sion of legitimacy which centres around the need for a democratic right to participate
directly in decision-making, alongside expertise, to remove this imbalance.
The recognition of the limits of expertise as the sole basis for legitimate decision-
making is also evidenced more broadly in the growing literature on the role and
value of public participation in decision-making; in particular, the democratisation of
environmental law.43 Again, this literature illustrates that whilst expertise still has a
role to play, alternative values and voices (eg the public) should also be included.
Although the terms used to describe participation vary, Arnstein’s seminal work is
demonstrative of the centrality of public participation (and the democratisation of
decision-making) in achieving decision-making legitimacy. Her conceptualisation of
the varying degrees of participation as a ladder places low levels of participation (eg
the public right to know) at the bottom and high levels of public participation and
control (eg citizen control of decisions) at the top.44 The ladder rungs have been
subject to various names, but the explicit assumption is that higher rungs of participa-
tion should be preferred/confer greater legitimacy.45 This demand for the democra-
tisation of decision-making is also present in Black’s call for thick proceduralisation.
This model emphasises the need to move away from purely technocratic/expert
dominated decisions and the need to also include direct participatory mechanisms
within decision-making.46 In a related vein, Holder calls for a cultural model of
decision-making which sees participation as a fundamental part of the decision-
40 ibid; see collection of scholarship in ‘Special Issue: Public Engagement in Science’ (n 36).
41 ibid; Brian Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings: Social Identities and the Public Uptake of
Science’ in Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of
Science and Technology (CUP 2009) 21, 39.
42 Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation’ (n 38); Wynne, Rationality and Ritual (n 38); Shrader-Frechette
(n 38); Irwin (n 38); Wynne, ‘Public Participation in Science and Technology’ (n 38) 109; Wynne,
‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings’ (n 41).
43 See, for example, Holder (n 6); Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environmental Law’ (n 6); Lee, ‘The
Legal and Institutionalization of Public Participation’ (n 6).
44 Sherry Arnstein, ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) 26 Journal of American Planners 216; Anne
Marie Goetz and John Gavanta, ‘Bringing Citizen Voice and Client Focus into Service Delivery’ (2001)
Brighton IDS Working Paper 138; Scott Davidson, ‘Spinning the Wheel of Empowerment’ (1998) 1262
Planning 14; Maria Weimer and Gaia Pisani, ‘Expertise as Justification: The Contested Legitimation of
the EU “Risk Administration”’ in Maria Weimer and Anniek Ruijter (eds), Regulating Risks in the
European Union (Hart 2017) 168.
45 ibid.
46 Julia Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part 1’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 597, 607; Julia
Black, ‘Proceduralizing Regulation: Part 2’ (2001) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33, 35.
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making process and necessitates the public’s direct involvement in decision-mak-
ing.47 Lee too emphasises the inherently political nature of environmental decisions
and argues for the inclusion of a broad range of values and voices.48
This shift towards the democratisation of decision-making within the literature
may be justified on the basis of increased representativeness/openness within
decision-making, but may not, as this study suggests, be of value in terms of public
perceptions/public acceptability. The findings of this article force us to reflect upon
how we, as scholars, define both a legitimate decision and the purpose/value of par-
ticipation. In turn, we must question the weight we do, and should, give to different
measures when defining a legitimate decision (ie substance, and/or procedural open-
ness or representativeness and/or public acceptability/public perceptions of
legitimacy).
4.1. Fracking: A New Context
Literature from the social sciences shows that the fracking debate is contentious.49
The practical difficulties faced when the public do not consider a decision to be legit-
imate is particularly visible in the context of fracking with numerous protests having
taken place across England. Between January 2017 and December 2018, a total of
435 arrests were made at the Preston New Road Site in Lancashire and almost all
(429) resulted in charges sanctioned.50 In September 2018, a public nuisance pros-
ecution of protestors from this site resulted in a somewhat surprising imposition of
custodial sentences for three protesters.51 Such protests have been compounded by
numerous legal challenges from those on both sides of the debate.52 Bradshaw and
Waite have warned that despite exploration activities continuing in Lancashire, fur-
ther conflicts and constraints on commercial development are likely to occur if the
issue of public acceptability is ignored.53
The centrality of public acceptability to fracking developments has yet to be
explored in the literature on shale gas. While a number of surveys have explored pub-
lic perceptions of shale gas and fracking, such work has focused on whether people
47 ibid; Holder (n 6).
48 Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environmental Law’ (n 6) 993.
49 Chris Hilson, ‘Framing Fracking: Which Frames are Heard in English Planning and Environmental Policy
and Practice’ (2014) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 1; Elen Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory
Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of ‘Fracking’ (2016) 79 Modern Language Review 1468;
Elizabeth Bomberg, ‘Shale We Drill? Discourse Dynamics in UK Fracking Debates’ (2017) 19 Journal of
Environmental Policy and Planning 72; Laurence Williams and others, ‘Framing “Fracking”: Exploring
Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing in the United Kingdom’ (2015) 13 Public Understanding of
Science 1.
50 Lancashire Constabulary, ‘Fracking’ <www.lancashire.police.uk/help-advice/safer-communities/
fracking> accessed 3 July 2019.
51 R v Roberts (Richard) [2018] EWCA Crim 2739—the sentences were later overturned by the Court of
Appeal as being ‘manifestly excessive’.
52 See, for example, R (on the Application of Dennett) v Lancashire CC [2018] 10 WLUK 224; R (on the ap-
plication of Friends of the Earth Ltd) v North Yorkshire CC [2016] EWHC 3303 (Admin).
53 Michael Bradshaw and Catherine Waite, ‘Learning from Lancashire: Exploring the Contours of the Shale
Gas Conflict in England’ (2017) 47 Global Environmental Change 28; Matthew Cotton, ‘Fair Fracking?
Ethics and Environmental Justice in United Kingdom Shale Gas Policy and Planning’ (2017) 2 Local
Environment 198.
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agree or disagree with shale gas exploration and have not encompassed perceptions’
of the decision-making system itself.54 A Sciencewise report first drew attention to
the issue of public engagement with decisions on fracking in 2016.55 This report,
designed to inform the Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil’s (OUGO) public en-
gagement policy, focused on pragmatic means to engage the public in current
decision-making. Again, this was built on the assumption that such engagement was
desirable and did not explore the role that participation or expertise played in legiti-
mating decisions. This article is about confronting, contesting and challenging the as-
sumption that direct participation in decision-making plays such a legitimating role.
As this article will show, for my interviewees, participation is posited in a very differ-
ent role for a very different purpose.
While the literature on fracking to date has not focused on the perceived legitim-
acy of decisions, the issues around framing and the power afforded to different voi-
ces/frames in the debate have become very visible. Williams and others’ study of
fracking in the North of England emphasised how the use of a technical frame (that
focuses on technical risk) has already been employed by the Government and other
institutional actors.56 Both Hilson and Stokes have demonstrated that the issue can
and has been framed in a number of different ways by different actors.57 These differ-
ent frames are visible in both the debate and the way in which current decision-
making systems, ie planning and regulatory systems, have justified different
approaches. Nyberg and others have also highlighted the way in which current devel-
opments are enmeshed in a framing contest to determine the future of develop-
ment.58 While scholars such as Bomberg have argued that the anti-fracking discourse
has expanded beyond economic or environmental concerns to include potent issues
of local power and democracy, this has not been mirrored in the frames present with-
in decision-making and policy.59 Cotton has drawn attention to the shift in fracking-
related policy which has seen a move from emphasis on the protection of commun-
ities towards pro-industry economic planning controls and legislation, whilst Aczel
and others have highlighted the perceived lack of concern for the local scale in deci-
sion-making.60
Although a number of years have elapsed since data collection began, there have
been no significant changes to fracking decision-making procedures. However,
changes have been made to planning guidance which means that local councils who
fail to reach a decision on planning consent within 16 weeks (the statutory time
54 See, for example, Sarah O’Hara and others, ‘Public Perceptions of Shale Gas Extraction in the UK: Two
Years on from the Balcombe Protests’ (Better Society, 15 October 2015) www.bettersociety.net/images/
Public%20Perceptions%20of%20shale%20gas%20in%20the%20UK%20sept131015MH.WK.JA-H.pdf>
accessed 3 July 2019; Whitmarsh and others (n 22); BEIS (n 24).
55 TNS BRMB, ‘Public Engagement with Shale Oil and Gas’ (URN 14D/262, December 2014) 3.
56 Williams and others (n 49).
57 Stokes (n 49) 5; Hilson (n 49).
58 Daniel Nyberg, Christopher Wright and Jacqueline Kirk, ‘Fracking the Future: Temporality, Framing and
the Politics of Unconventional Fossil Fuels’ (2017) 1 Academy of Management Proceedings 104.
59 Bomberg (n 49).
60 Cotton (n 53); Miriam Aczel, Karen Makuch and Manel Chibane, ‘How Much Is Enough? Approaches
to Public Participation in Shale Gas Regulation Across England, France, and Algeria’ (2018) 5 The
Extractive Industries 427.
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frame for an application) may see their oil/gas applications decided by the Secretary
of State.61 The changes also extend the Minister’s power to ‘call in’ applications and
to decide on planning appeals.62 This is unlikely to alter the key themes discussed
here given the reasons behind interviewees’ desired model of decision-making. If ex-
cessive use is made of the power to call in applications and decisions ie they are not
left to local authorities, further data may be required. This is particularly so if changes
from the recent consultation regarding permitted development rights for non-
fracking shale gas exploration activities and the re-classification of shale gas produc-
tion as an NSIP are implemented.63
5. ‘WE WANT EXPERTS’ : THE EXPLICIT DESIRE FOR EXPERTS
While the theory behind legitimate decision-making has shown a progressive move
away from expert dominated decision-making and emphasised the importance of
embedding participation, the data from my research offers a very different narrative.
As highlighted by the opening quote of this article, interviewees ‘want experts. We
want people who know about these things’.64 Interviewees were keen to ‘talk to peo-
ple that understand science’65 because they ‘Joe Soap . . . don’t know enough about
it’.66 This demand for expert-led decision-making stands in clear contrast to the way
the scholarship has defined legitimate decision-making.67 The strong demand for ex-
pertise from the people I spoke with and ‘a totally independent body . . . with quali-
fied people in each section of everything that there is’68 was striking and surprising,
given I conducted the interviews and focus groups after immersing myself in the lit-
eratures discussed above. This is particularly so because such an expert dominated
process is often associated with the dismissal of public concerns that do not align
with an experts’ own world view/values.69
The idea that interviewees ‘wouldn’t particularly feel the need to do what we’re
doing [in reference to their anti-fracking opposition] if they were truly independ-
ent’70 suggests, somewhat to the contrary, that from interviewee’s perspective,
61 Greg Clark, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, ‘Planning for Onshore Oil and
Gas: Written Statement’ (HCWS201, 16 September 2015).
62 ibid.
63 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, ‘Permitted Development for Shale Gas
Exploration Consultation’ (19 July 2018). <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/726916/Consultation_document_-_shale_gas_permit
ted_development.pdf> accessed 3 July 2019.
64 M1 Interview 16.
65 Interview 6.
66 Interview 13.
67 Entman (n 39) 52; Vaughan and Seifert (n 39) 121; Yvonne Rydin, Maria Lee and Simon J Lock, ‘Public
Engagement in Decision-making on Major Wind Energy Projects’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental
Law 139, 142; Schon and Rein (n 39) 29; Hanggli and Kriesi (n 39) 266; Tversky and Kahneman (n 39)
458; Mark Brown, Science and Democracy (MIT Press 2009) xi, 44, 108; Arie Rip, ‘Experts in Public
Arenas’ in Harry Otway and Malcolm Peltu (eds), Regulating Industrial Risks: Science, Hazards and Public
Protection (Butterworths 1985) 98; Eden (n 39) 187; Shrader-Frechette (n 38).
68 C Focus Group 2.
69 Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation’ (n 38) 450, 452; Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings’ (n 41)
39; Claire Marris and others, ‘Public Attitudes to Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe’ (EU FP6 PABE
Final Project Report, Commission of European Communities, 2001) 91; Shrader-Frechette (n 38) 116.
70 C Focus Group 2.
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expert-led decision-making in the context of fracking is actually desired. Twenty of
my participants explicitly called for expert-led decision-making (two of these inter-
viewees believed this could only lead to a moratorium on fracking, one wanted ex-
pert-led decision-making to be accompanied by a local liaison with experts so they
could address public concerns, one wanted more expertise and financial underwriting
of the risk).
Two further interviewees engaged with the issue of expertise but were less clear in
their demand for expert-led decision-making: one interviewee wanted increased ex-
pert input but coupled with greater public participation, and one interviewee showed
great deference to expertise without explicitly calling for experts to play a greater
role. Two further interviewees were focused on the role of regulatory controls and
were happy for experts to lead on these but wanted better communication about risk
management. An additional two interviewees did not engage with the issue of expert-
ise: one interviewee felt that democratisation of the process was the single most im-
portant issue, and one interviewee was focused on compensation/compulsory
purchase for property.
From interviewees’ perspective, expert dominance is not perceived as an obstacle
to legitimate decision-making. This illustrates a clear divergence between the public’s
perception of legitimacy and the conceptualisation in existing scholarship of expert
dominance as something which generates a problematic imbalance of power within
decision-making.71 Given this contrast, why was the demand for expertise and ‘an in-
dependent body that can take a balanced view of what it’s (fracking) going to do to
an area, and if it’s going to have a serious impact or if it’s not’72 so explicit and so
persistent in the data? Importantly, it became clear that interviewees perceived frack-
ing as a primarily technical issue with emphasis on the need to assess and manage
the associated risks. The lack of desire to engage with these technical risks stemmed
from the perception that experts would be better placed to provide answers on the
extent of these impacts and how/whether they could be managed. Interviewees felt
that there should be a ‘panel of experts assessing risk’73 with their concerns focusing
on local environmental impacts. Accompanying this concern was the desire to see
decision-making that committed to environmental protection. Interviewees consid-
ered experts best placed to achieve this.
We don’t know what we don’t know, so I wouldn’t be able to say, to question on
what risks are, because they could say, oh, there are 3 risks, a, b and c – there may
be another 20, but they’re not telling me and I wouldn’t know that.74
In light of this, the assumed need to shift away from expert dominance in
decision-making in the context of fracking does not reflect the vision of legitimacy as
71 Wynne, Rationality and Ritual (n 38) 11, 129; Wynne, ‘Creating Public Alienation’ (n 38) 450, 452;
Shrader-Frechette (n 38) 115, 116; Irwin, ‘Risk, Science and Public Communication’ (n 38); Wynne,
‘Public Participation in Science and Technology’ (n 38).
72 Interview 16.
73 Interview 1.
74 Interview 13.
14  Fracking and the Case of Expert Excess
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jel/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jel/eqz022/5557829 by guest on 09 April 2020
advanced by interviewees. Interviewees wanted to both see experts and to rely on
them in decision-making: ‘A forum of experts should be available to answer ques-
tions from the floor . . . as residents living close to a site we have a right to know
what to expect.’75 As this quote, illustrative of the wider data, demonstrates, it is not
that the public does not want to be involved at all, but that their involvement should
be, they feel, framed and buttressed by expert-led decision-making.
5.2. Reconceptualising Expertise
5.2.1 Defining a status
Whilst interviewees were focused on the role that they wanted experts to play, ana-
lysis of the data showed that the status of experts was an important pre-cursor. Only
those who met interviewees’ ‘expert’ status, could go on to fulfil the desired decision-
making role. This status was based on trust. Trust in actors dealing with risk has
come to be recognised as an important factor in shaping the overall public percep-
tion of/acceptance of risk and decisions involving risk. This is because public con-
cerns are not confined to technical risks eg pollution, but extend further to
encompass concerns over the way in which actors making decisions about risk will
behave and their trustworthiness.76 Despite their focus on technical risks, and al-
though interviewees did not explicitly recognise the split between technical risk and
trust in experts, it became clear from the data that some of the concerns over frack-
ing were in fact intrinsically linked to actors’ trustworthiness.77
This importance of trustworthiness and status was clear when interviewees dis-
cussed current expert evidence, in decision-making, which often comes from consul-
tants paid by the shale gas operator/developer or by in-house teams.78 Interviewees
did not feel (in relation to an environmental statement about the development) that
‘Arup, being Cuadrilla’s employee, should be doing it.’79 They felt that it ‘should be a
totally independent body’80 that was in a position to pursue ‘environmental protec-
tion’. Industry experts were not considered to be experts by interviewees and did not
have the necessary status. As such their dismissal of a concern/risk was not accepted.
One interviewee told of the way he was made to feel like ‘a nutcase by prattling on
75 Interview 10.
76 Paul Slovic, ‘Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy’ (1993) 13 Risk Analysis 675; Brian Wynne,
‘Technology, Risk and Participation: On the Social Treatment of Uncertainty’ in Jobst Conrad (ed)
Society, Technology and Risk Assessment (Academic Press 1980); Roger E Kasperson, Dominic Golding
and Seth Tuler, ‘Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting Hazardous Facilities and Communication Risks’
(1992) 48 Journal of Social Issues 161; Michael Cardwell, The European Model of Agriculture (OUP
2004) 80; Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings’ (n 41) 20; The BSE Inquiry, The Report. Volume
One Findings and Conclusions: Executive Summary of the Enquiry 1. Key Conclusions (2000).
77 This corresponds with findings from work on chemical hazards: Alan Irwin, Peter Simmons and Gordon
Walker, ‘Faulty Environments and Risk Reasoning: The Local Understanding of Industrial Hazards’
(1999) 31 Environment and Planning A 1311, 1324.
78 See, for example, Cuadrilla’s appointment of Arup as provider for its Environmental Impact Assessments
and Environmental Statements (14 June 2013) <www.arup.com/news-and-events/news/cuadrilla-
appoints-arup-to-conduct-independent-eias> accessed 3 July 2019.
79 Interview 18.
80 Interview 18.
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about it’81 when he raised a concern at an industry event. Yet this is not simply a
preference for public perception of risk over experts. It is a manifestation of the dis-
trust/failure of those currently categorised as experts in our decision-making process
(eg industry actors) to meet interviewee’s requisite expert status. The data suggest a
general preparedness amongst interviewees to accept such a dismissal of risk if it
comes from an actor with this expert status.
So there has to be a long-term scientific input that’s taken very seriously. And
that means it isn’t paid scientists who give them the answers they want because
that’s sycophantic and a recipe for disaster.82
Trust and independence are the central issue at play here. At present many of those
who are currently treated as experts in decision-making are not trusted due to their
perceived lack of independence. To facilitate the new role that the public foresee for
experts these issues of status and distrust must be acknowledged.83 This need is dem-
onstrated by the fact that distrust extended beyond industry and encompassed the
Environment Agency (EA) who were viewed as ‘not fit for purpose’.84 Distrust here
in relation to the EA, stemmed from a general perception that they lacked the rele-
vant onshore oil and gas experience and were not sufficiently independent from gov-
ernment pressure to support fracking.85
In short, the public want experts to make decisions, but they need to be experts in
whom the public has trust. The factors underpinning this trust warrant further exam-
ination but are predominantly shaped by the perceived independence of an expert.
5.2.2 Defining a delegated role
While one could argue that this desire to rely on independent experts is simply a
manifestation of the inherent dominance of existing institutional orthodoxies and
expertise’s oppressive nature (ie the issue has already been constructed as, and
reduced down to, one of technical risk through existing institutional traditions), it is
crucial to note that interviewees were not deferring to expertise in the abstract. They
made very clear assumptions about how those with expert status would act and/or
the role they would fulfil, revealing that the boundary between technical and political
was in fact pervasive and challenging. This was brought to the fore by the inherent
assumption in the data that in making their decisions ‘the correct resources will be
engaged from up high to look after the environment for residents’.86 Interviewees
held clear assumptions about how expertise would be deployed in decision-making.
It was clear that an expert was much more than someone who was just independent,
81 Interview 11.
82 Interview 6.
83 A further work on how the public construct the notion of trust in decision makers will explore this issue
in more depth.
84 D Focus Group 2.
85 Distrust of such bodies is not a novel finding, see, for example, Luc Bodiguel and Malcolm Cardwell
(eds), The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches (OUP 2010) 12.
86 M6 Focus Group 1.
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it was someone to whom the public could delegate a role: environmental protection
(pre-dominantly focused on local impacts and local environment).87
This finding is problematic because it means that contrary to what my interview-
ees said (that they wanted to defer to expert-led decision-making), interviewees did
in fact have a very strong view on the values that should shape decision-making (ie
environmental protection). This illustrates that interviewees were not prepared to
defer to expertise and its own frame/values in the abstract. Interviewees actually
wanted to reposition public values (in this context environmental protection) as the
dominant value frame. However, they wanted to delegate the pursuit of these values
to experts, rather than advancing these values in the decision-making procedure
themselves (ie through direct participation).
The inherent contradiction revealed here is of significant interest. It is a vision of
expertise founded upon a fundamental misconception. The misconception of ‘expert
excess’: an excessive expectation about what experts can and will deliver in decision-
making. Traditionally, expertise is not aimed at securing a broader political or social
goal, rather it is shaped and restricted by, its own inherent values and views.88
Interviewee’s conceptualisation of experts and their role posits an idealised vision
with both theoretical and practical challenges. It cannot be ignored that throughout
the decision-making process experts are making normative choices.89 This miscon-
ception demonstrates that interviewees vision of expertise does not acknowledge, or
engage with, the idea that experts are inevitably influenced by their own inherent val-
ues and knowledge traditions. In turn, there is a fundamental misconception over
experts’ ability to simply hold up a mirror, providing assessments which reflect an ob-
jective reality.90 The public’s assumption that experts can access an objective reality,
and make decisions on it which transgress the deeply embedded knowledge tradi-
tions and inherent normative choices, in pursuit of a broader social goal (ie environ-
mental protections), is problematic.91 Pursuing any kind of broader social/political
goal will be constrained by these pre-existing values and knowledge traditions which
will inevitably shape an expert’s construction of the issue, its evaluation and potential
outcomes. In an area such as fracking, which involves uncertainties and where data
often cuts across disciplines, the disciplinary and social biases of experts are particu-
larly problematic. In such a context, it can be difficult for experts to be sufficiently
87 This article engages with issues relating to decision-making procedures. However, the definition of envir-
onmental protection is one that requires further attention. This is particularly so in analysing how we de-
termine the relevant content eg local v global scale. It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in
debate over the substance of this term. This will be further explored in additional scholarship.
88 Wynne, Rationality and Ritual (n 38) 129; Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures (Hackett Publishing
Company 2004) 17; Karin Knorr Cetina, Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge (Harvard
UP 1999) 6; Douglas Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere. Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity
(Yale UP 2010) 231; Barbara Shapiro, ‘Fact and the Proof of Fact’ in Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and
Martha M Umphrey (eds), How Law Knows (Stanford UP 2007) 28, 60; Brian Wynne, ‘Seasick on the
Third Wave? Subverting Hegemony of Propositionalism: Response to Collin and Evans (2002)’ (2003)
33 Social Studies of Science 401, 402, 407.
89 Cetina, ibid 6; Kysar, ibid 231; Shapiro, ibid 28.
90 Yvonne Rydin and others, ‘Black-boxing the Evidence: Planning Regulation and Major Renewable Energy
infrastructure Projects in England and Wales’ (2018) 19 Planning Theory and Practice 218, 220; Bruno
Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard UP 1999).
91 ibid.
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detached and able to reflect on these biases and/or question the objectives and
methods underlying particular claims and knowledge.92 This means that even if
deeper reflection and transparency regarding how, within legal decision-making, nor-
mative choices are made takes place (ie relating to the weight given to pieces of evi-
dence, the underpinning assumptions present and crucially, the way in which the
choice reflects the aim of environmental protection), this still risks reducing the issue
to one dominated by experts’ own inherent values/worldviews.93
The misconception of expert excess present in the data suggests that the public
view experts as knowledge producers for the service of others.94 This conception pla-
ces great emphasis on the trust placed in such experts to create usable knowledge in
areas of uncertainty and contestation (emphasising the importance of also ensuring
experts meet the status requirements of independence). However, it fails to recog-
nise the drivers and influences inherent in expertise that will inevitably shape what
experts are able to deliver in decision-making, and the way that this will restrict any
pursuit of a broader goal (ie environmental protection).
While the misconception renders this new conceptualisation of expertise a some-
what unrealistic model, the important question remains; why has such a misconcep-
tion emerged and what does this say about our current decision-making
procedures?95 Although not explicit in the data, it would be easy to revert and say
that this misconception merely echoes the scholarship which argues for the increased
democratisation of decision-making to ensure these alternative views and values
(broader social/political goals) are incorporated in decision-making.96 This, in turn
would, as the literature argues, challenge the knowledge that is used under an expert
frame and the inherent assumptions within it.
However, it is clear from the data, that interviewees do not consider direct partici-
pation in decision-making procedures, which enable the inclusion of such alternative
views/values, to be a legitimating factor. Further exploration is needed of why inter-
viewees do not see direct participation as the best means to ensure their values are
given weight in the decision-making process. Instead, they feel the need to reposition
themselves as delegators, leaving the pursuit of such values to a public champion;
experts. The following section explores what level of involvement was called for and
the type of/purpose of the participation that was warranted.
92 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits’ (2006) 69 Law and
Contemporary Problems 21.
93 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths. Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law Review
1723, 1743; Shapiro (n 88) 103, 104; Donald Braman and Dan M Kahan, ‘Legal Realism as Psychological
and Cultural (Not Political) Realism’ in Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey (eds) (n 88) 94.
94 Jane Hunt and Simon Shackley, ‘Reconceiving Science and Policy: Academic, Fiducial and Bureaucratic
Knowledge’ (1999) 37 Minerva 141; Jasanoff (n 93).
95 See, for example, empirical research on Marine Conservation Zones by M Pieraccini which highlights the
connection between the form of participatory opportunities and the negative pragmatic effects that such
design can have how the issue/development is perceived; Margherita Pieraccini, ‘Rethinking Participation
in Environmental Decision-making: Epistemologies of Marine Conservation in South-East England’
(2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 45, 66.
96 See collection of scholarship in ‘Special Issue: Public Engagement in Science’ (n 36).
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5.3 Direct Participation: People ‘Couldn’t Give a Monkeys’97
The above discussion demonstrates the lack of explicit demand, from interviewees,
for direct participatory opportunities to voice views, values or knowledges that might
be broader than those advanced by experts. This is so even though the data reveals
the inherent presence of strong interviewee views on the values that should shape
decision-making (ie environmental protection). Despite this, interviewees called for
expert-led decision-making suggesting that under the role they envisaged for experts,
they did not consider there to be a problematic imbalance of power between experts
and the public.98 This is supported by the lack of desire to contribute directly to the
decision-making process.
As such, how can we continue to claim that direct participation is vital to securing
legitimacy?99 It would be a rather striking claim if we were to say that the public do
not know what they need. It would continue to unquestioningly privilege academic
views on legitimacy, giving little weight to the empirical. This suggests that in defin-
ing legitimacy, we are privileging the concepts of representativeness/inclusiveness
over public perceptions of legitimacy/public acceptability. Given the striking differ-
ence between theoretical and empirical understandings, there is a need to re-evaluate
the weight we give to public perceptions of legitimacy. This in turn necessitates a
subsequent re-evaluation of the assumption that expertise is necessarily a problematic
basis for decision-making and that direct participation/the democratisation of the
process is always desired.
Yet why, when interviewees had strong inherent views on the values that should
shape decision-making, were calls for direct participation notably absent or consid-
ered with scepticism? My interviewees showed clear concern over the way in which
direct participation allowed for non-expert influences over the decision-making pro-
cedures as this quotation highlights:
. . . But I don’t think somebody that has no knowledge of it can come in and
say, ‘well, you should do this and you shouldn’t do that’ because it’s like me
going and saying, ‘oh well, you should do this and you should do that’, and I
don’t know.100
The assumption that direct participation is either desired or an improvement for
decision-making is questionable (a point that this article is not alone in making).
The proposition that direct participation is not always desired (for various reasons
eg citizens/the public do not care enough to actively take part in participatory proc-
esses) and so financial resources would be better directed elsewhere (eg at
97 Interview 16.
98 Irwin, Simmons and Walker (n 77) 1319; Lee, ‘Experts and Publics in EU Environmental Law’ (n 6)
993; Irwin, ‘Risk, Science and Public Communication (n 38) 167; Slovic, ‘The Risk Game’ (n 38) 19;
James Wilsdon, Brian Wynne and Jack Stilgoe, The Public Value of Science – Or How to Ensure That
Science Really Matters (Demos 2005) 27; Williams and others (n 49) 3.
99 The assumption that direct participation is always desired or an improvement for decision-making is
something that has been challenged in the literature, see, for example, Steele (n 7); Irwin, Jensen and
Jones (n 7) 127; Irvin and Stansbury (n 7) 62; Davies (n 7) 194.
100 Interview 14.
Fracking and the Case of Expert Excess  19
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jel/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jel/eqz022/5557829 by guest on 09 April 2020
implementation/enforcement) resonates with the absence of a demand for such
opportunities.101 The data from my research question the very purpose of direct par-
ticipation in decision-making procedures. This form of participation not only fails to
contribute to interviewees’ perceptions of legitimacy, but conversely raises additional
concerns for interviewees over the limited range of voices which direct participation
advances:
. . . and we’ve got the people that will have it . . . they’ve no interest in this
whatever on whatever basis, the green people and all this – it’s a ‘no’, irrespect-
ive of whatever. And the other people are saying, well, we need this and it’s
going to go ahead, whatever. And in the middle we as a community are
squeezed.102
While parties such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) undoubtedly have a
significant role to play in advancing under represented interests, and in countering
business and industry groups, a move to a participatory system which sees such
groups dominating participatory opportunities is problematic. It raises fundamental
issues surrounding the exclusion of other interests, and voices/values outside this set
of participants.103 This is particularly problematic when my interviewees believed
that ‘there’s probably 70% of the population couldn’t give a monkeys about it’104 and
that they, the interviewees, themselves were ‘too laid back and apathetic’ and were
more concerned with ‘just want[ing] to know how the carrots are growing’.105
The data suggest that active direct participation in relation to fracking decisions is
not considered a legitimating factor by interviewees. With the need to redress elite
domination a central argument in favour of such a form of participation, it is of note
that there was an absence of any concern over such elite domination by experts in
the data.106 This suggests that a broad democratic right to participate directly in
decision-making, as argued for in the literature, and an indiscriminate extension of
participatory rights are unwarranted for these interviewees.107 The problematic na-
ture of this indiscriminate extension is evidenced in the concerns, discussed above,
that interviewees expressed regarding the role of direct public participation. Instead,
legitimacy for them revolves around the extent to which decisions are made by
trusted experts who are pursuing a delegated role (ie environmental protection).
101 ibid.
102 M6 Focus Group 1.
103 Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation under the Aarhus Convention’
(2003) 66 Modern Language Review 80, 86–88.
104 Interview 16.
105 Interview 13.
106 Harry M Collins and Robert Evans, ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: A Study of Expertise and
Experience’ (2002) 32 Social Studies of Science 235, 278.
107 See discussion in Harry M Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (University of Chicago Press
2007) 2; for discussion of this theory, see Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Breaking the Waves in Science Studies:
Comment on HM Collins and Robert Evans “The Third Wave of Science Studies”’ (2003) 33 Social
Studies of Science 389; Wynne, ‘Seasick on the Third Wave?’ (n 88); Harry M Collins and Robert
Evans, ‘King Canute Meets the Beach Boys: Responses to “The Third Wave”’ (2003) 33 Social Studies
of Science 435.
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Expert-led decision-making, rather than being an obstacle to legitimacy, is in fact the
foundational factor which affects interviewees’ perception of decision-making legitim-
acy. Such data prompts reflection upon why, as scholars, we continue to shape our
definition of legitimacy around a form of participation which is not desired or consid-
ered legitimating by the very group upon whom we impose it. Are we saying, in ef-
fect, that we know better?
Yet, as highlighted, the data reveals a contradictory inherent assumption: that
experts would be committed to environmental protection. Without this commitment
to a broader political/social goal of environmental protection (as defined by inter-
viewees), even trusted experts cannot fulfil the role that interviewees have set out.
Yet, it is impossible to ascertain what this desired goal is in any given context unless
the public tell us. This by its very nature necessitates some form of public input,
even if not explicitly recognised by interviewees. If interviewees do not want to par-
ticipate directly in decision-making, we need to explore the alternative form and pur-
pose of any such participation.
Examining the purpose of the participation needed to facilitate this new expert
role reveals another contradiction in the data. Alongside the explicit desire to see ex-
pert-led decision-making, this suggests an implicit desire to see the privileging of
public values (ie through the publicly defined goal that experts must pursue). If the
public want to delegate, the terms of delegation will likely vary in the context of dif-
ferent decisions. If the public are to set the terms of delegation, demarcating the
overarching political/social goal to be pursued by experts, this places them in a pos-
ition of elevated power. They become a powerful group who dictate the overarching
decision-making goal. This power is far greater than that afforded to them under a
model of direct participation where their voice is only afforded equal weight in the
decision-making process. The participation that is needed here is not the familiar
one that legitimises decisions because the procedure is more democratic or inclusive.
It repositions both the purpose and value of participation. Interviewees do not want
to take part in the decision directly; they want a body of experts to act as a kind of
public champion, pursuing a publicly defined goal. This forces us to reflect on two
things: first, the difficulty of designing the type of participation that is actually
needed/wanted and that the public perceive to have legitimating value and secondly,
why the public do not want to participate directly in decision-making and feel that
delegation, and the type of participation it warrants, is the best means of ensuring
they are empowered within the decision-making process.
The model that interviewees are advancing is not simple to implement. However,
the expert role envisioned by interviewees, and the type of participation this necessi-
tates, is neither devoid of epistemological considerations, nor a blind following of
what has come before. It is a positive choice to reconstruct the relationship between
experts and the public through defined terms of delegation. Such a model empowers
the public within decision-making without requiring them to directly participate in
the decision, something which interviewees do not want to do. The allocation of
decision-making responsibility to experts is done on the proviso that they comply
with delegated terms, which acknowledge broader political and social values. 108 This
108 Jasanoff (n 93) 1723, 1742
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provides an explicit yardstick against which such experts can be judged.109 This con-
cept of delegation on clearly delineated terms is not something that we currently en-
gage with in defining the role we construct for experts in decision-making. As such,
the vision of expertise propounded by my interviewees, and the type of participation
it necessitates, digresses from the traditional understanding of an expert’s role/how
expertise operates and the purpose/value of public participation in decision-making.
The data demonstrate that many of the problems we traditionally associate with
expert dominance (such as power imbalance and elite domination) stem from the
way in which we, as scholars and policy makers, traditionally conceptualise the role
of experts and the form/purpose of participation. We should reflect on why (if the
public explicitly want to delegate decision-making to experts and reposition the pur-
pose of participation) we refuse to re-evaluate our current conceptualisation of the
role and purpose of both expertise and public participation. This data from the con-
text of fracking shows that at present, if we define legitimacy according to interview-
ees’ perception of legitimacy, the assumption that direct participation in decision-
making is desirable is misplaced. Such a model may be justified on alternative
grounds, ie better representativeness, better openness in decision-making. However,
the contrast between the public perception of legitimacy and the models that we pro-
mote as scholars begs the question: to what extent should our model of legitimacy,
and how we define a legitimate decision, give weight to the empirical and the public’s
perception of legitimacy? In the context of a development that has proved to be
highly controversial, and over which there have been numerous challenges to regula-
tory decisions, this is a significant question.
6. CONCLUSION
For my interviewees, empirically grounded perceptions of legitimacy in the context
of shale gas revolve around the presence of expert-led decision-making. This chal-
lenges the assumption in the literature that expert dominated decision-making is ne-
cessarily undesirable and damaging to decision-making legitimacy.110 Consequently,
this contests the existing assumption in the associated literature that direct participa-
tion/the democratisation of decision-making is central to legitimacy. While this art-
icle does not claim that the role of expertise is misconstrued in all decision-making
arenas, it highlights how current theoretical assumptions and definitions relating to
legitimate decision-making fail to correspond with empirically grounded public per-
ceptions of decision-making legitimacy.
Notably, definition of an expert’s role amongst my interviewees digressed signifi-
cantly from our traditional conceptualisation. They saw experts as a body of people,
109 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Expert Executive Power, Administrative Constitutionalism and Co-Production: Why
They Matter’ in Weimer and Ruijter (eds) (n 44) 39; Chris Anderson, ‘Evolving Conception of Science
and Legitimacy: Insights from American Administrative Law’ in Weimer and Ruijter (eds) (n 44)194.
110 Data from the USA and the UK have shown that in the context of shale gas, independent scientists are
amongst the most trusted body of people; See Merryn Thomas and others, ‘Public Perceptions of
Hydraulic Fracturing for Shale Gas and Oil in the United States and Canada’ (2017) 8 WIREs Climate
Change e450; Ipsos, ‘Ipsos MORI Veracity Index 2018: Trust in Professions’ Ipsos MORI, (18
November 2018) <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-11/veracity_
index_2018_v1_161118_public.pdf> accessed 3 July 2019.
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public champions, to whom decision-making responsibility could be delegated. This
delegation was only made to ‘trusted’ experts who met with the requisite status (cen-
tring on their perceived independence) and involved a clearly defined goal: namely
that experts would be committed to ‘environmental protection’.
This re-positioning of the public as delegators places them in a position of power
which legitimises expert-led decisions without the need for direct participation, un-
wanted by the public, in the decision itself. The issue at present around expertise in
decision-making, and the public’s refusal to recognise many of those we currently
call experts, stems first from their failure to meet the requisite expert status. Second,
at present, experts are operating on the basis of their own traditional knowledges/
values free from the obligation to act as public champions, pursuing a delegated pol-
itical/social role that has been defined by the public. It is this lack of scope for dele-
gation that this article argues is damaging to public perceptions of legitimacy, not the
dominance of expertise itself.
Given the empirical grounding of this work, in relation to an issue with very direct
impacts upon members of the public, the desire for and repositioning of expertise
and participation does, and rightly should, raise significant questions around why we
seek to enhance and embed the role of the public directly in decision-making itself.
That is, if the public want to reposition participation as a mechanism for setting
terms of delegation, and want experts to make decisions, why should we as scholars
tell them we know better? Reflection is needed upon the extent to which we should
continue to impose a direct form of participation on a public who do not want it, on
the basis that we have a better understanding of what a legitimate decision looks like.
Despite the clear demand for expert-led decision-making, it cannot be ignored
that there are inherent contradictions present in the data. The public assume that
experts will pursue the publicly delegated goal of environmental protection. This evi-
dences two key issues. First, converse to the historically problematic notion of ‘public
deficit’, what we appear to have here is the misconception of ‘expert excess’: an ex-
cessive expectation about what experts can and will deliver in decision-making.111
Secondly, it provides a stark illustration of how challenging it is to design and imple-
ment participatory procedures which are actually desired/have legitimating value.
For my interviewees, participation was not explicitly called for but was inherently ne-
cessary to facilitate the new role they set out for experts (ie to define terms of delega-
tion). Yet, this version of participation is far removed from the one with which we
are familiar in the literature. It repositions participation, not as a legitimating factor
because it enhances the openness/representativeness of decision-making directly, but
as a means of empowerment which elevates the status and power afforded to the
public voice and values. The type of participation that is necessary to implement
interviewee’s expert-led system repositions the public as the overriding determiners
of decision-making goals and values, privileging their role in decision-making. We
must probe further into why the public feel that their views warrant this privilege,
and why they believe that allocating the fulfilment of such goals to experts is a better
model than participating directly in the decision themselves. In particular, it forces us
to reflect upon, and question, the extent to which this demand echoes a lack of
111 Jasanoff (n 93).
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empowerment under existing participatory mechanisms which may result in the per-
ceived need for a more powerful public voice and public champion. This misconcep-
tion around expertise, and the insights into the type of participation that my
interviewees need, offers an exciting empirical insight into how the public are build-
ing their own perceptions of legitimate decision-making. It also offers a new and un-
explored insight into how this perception of legitimacy reflects our current system
and, importantly, what this tells us about the failures and power imbalances that exist
within it.
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